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STATE OF MAINE 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
~OSEPH E. BRENNAN 
GOVERNOR 
The Honorable Joseph E. Brennan 
Governor of Maine 
The Blaine House 
Augusta, Maine 04333 
Dear Governor Brennan, 
May 23, 1986 
Maine now faces the difficult and costly choices that the 
nation deferred in its rush from the 1950's through the 1970's to 
realize the economic benefits of a civilian nuclear power 
program. Today, more than forty years into the nuclear era, 
there is no broad consensus on a technical solution to the 
nuclear waste disposal problem. In recent weeks, a major nuclear 
accident has occurred near Chernobyl in the Ukraine, the exact 
causes, dimensions, and full effects of which are unknown. 
In this setting, you have asked us to respond to a series of 
questions on the impacts of a mandatory early shutdown of the 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant, the State's principal source of 
low-level nuclear waste and its only source of high-level waste. 
We have organized the report around responses to each of your 
questions~ addressing legal, technical~ and economic 
considerations. Our conclusions depend on many assumptions about 
future oil prices, costs for alternative power sources, Maine 
Yankee operating costs, and the amount of compensation due to the 
plant's owners in the event of an early shutdown. They are, 
therefore, not precise forecasts, but informed judgments which 
bracket the likely possibilities. 
The threshold question in any discussion of an early 
shutdown of Maine Yankee is whether it will pass basic legal and-
constitutional tests. We believe it will be very difficult, at 
best, for the State of Maine to acquire the legal means to force 
an early shutdown of Maine Yankee. It appears certain from a 
1983 ruling of the United States Supreme Court, subsequent to the 
second Maine Yankee referendum, that any effort by a State to 
close a nuclear power plant because of health, safety, or 
operational considerations will be found unconstitutional under 
current federal law. 
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This makes nuclear power reactors unique among industrial 
facilities, in the degree of their insulation from State 
regulation. In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 to provide federal pre-emption of any State responsibility 
in the area of health and safety. The reasons justifying 
pre-emption at the time - such as the lack of widespread 
expertise and the need to nurture a complex technology with major 
defense relationships - are no longer compelling. Consequently, 
we would recommend that as a precondition to another statewide 
referendum on Maine Yankee, the State seek repeal in the Congress 
of the pre-emptive features in the relevant federal statutes. 
The Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the State's 
traditional regulatory authority over economic questions, 
however. Accordingly, a shutdown based on the economic costs of a 
serious accident might be more legally defensible. Indeed, if 
there is any argument to be made for a State-enforced closing of 
a civilian nuclear power plant which might succe9d legally at 
present, we believe it is that the expected costs of a 
catastrophic accident would so far exceed available federal 
insurance protection. To make this case, however, one would have 
to address the question of accident probabilities, thereby 
encountering the Supreme Court's proscription of safety from 
radiation hazards as a basis for State regulation. It is, 
further, unlikely that the economic costs of the nuclear waste 
problem alone would suffice to enable State shutdown legislation 
to survive legal challenge. Finally, a decision that Maine 
Yankee power was uneconomic for Maine could simply result in the 
sale of Maine utilities' share of the plant, without compelling a 
shutdown. 
An early shutdown of Maine Yankee would produce two 
principal benefits for Maine people. First, it would eliminate 
the possibility of a catastrophic operating accident; such a 
risk, however small statistically, is of deep concern to many 
Maine citizens. An accident with a nominal radiation release, as 
was the case at Three Mile Island, could be disastrously costly; 
a catastrophic release of radiation would have unparalleled costs 
to human and environmental health and the Maine economy. While 
we have not quantified the economic costs of such an accident, 
they could greatly exceed the economic savings from continued 
operation of Maine Yankee. The second benefit of an early 
shutdown would be that production of low-level waste and spent 
fuel at Maine Yankee would cease. 
There would be two major areas of cost. First, alternative 
power sources would have to be found to replace Maine Yankee, 
which produces 27 percent of the electricity sold by Maine 
utilities at a wholesale price of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour. 
This is considerably less expensive than any new sources of power 
generation which might replace Maine Yankee. 
\ 
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Extansive computer modelling by the Maine Public Utilities 
Commission indicates that the total additional cost of electric 
power to Maine customers between 1989 and 2008 (the intended date 
of plant retirement) would be between $380 million and $3.4 
billion in 1986 dollars (with the effect of inflation removed). 
The wide variation in these numbers reflects the range of 
possible events affecting prices of alternative energy sources, 
especially oil; and their volatility. We regard the high and low 
ends of the range as unlikely, and the mid-point, or about $2 
billion, as a reasonable statement of likely replacement power 
cost to Maine customers. The cost to out-of-State customers, who 
consume one-half of the Maine Yankee output, is likely to be 
similar in magnitude. 
The total cost to Maine people of a 1989 shutdown, including 
compensation to the plant's owners, would lie between $500 
million and $6.8 billion in today's dollars. This would amount 
to an increase of between 2.5 and 2~ percent in annual electric 
bills, if compensation to out-of-State owners were included in 
the rate structure. Alternatively, compensation could add 
between $120 million and $3.4 billion in new demands on the 
State's General Fund, leaving an annual increase to electric 
ratepayers of between 2 and 14 percent for replacement power. 
A State Planning Office analysis indicates that, in the 
short run, an early shutdown would result in the loss of between 
1,000 and 1,800 full-time jobs, including 290 at Maine Yankee 
itself. Additional costs to industrial customers (estimated by 
Central Maine Power for its customers at $806 million, 1989-2008) 
could inhibit business expansion, increase consumer prices, and 
materially damage Maine industries that depend heavily on 
purchased electricity. These immediate effects could be overcome 
in time through concerted State government leadership, 
accompanied by strong citizen support of more aggressive energy 
conservation, hydropower imports, and development of renewable 
energy sources which could more than offset the job losses at 
Maine Yankee. 
There is no time before 2008 when a Maine Yankee shut-down 
can be scheduled without a net cost to Maine people. The least 
disruptive schedule, if an early shutdown decision were made now, 
would be to work toward the mid-1990's, allowing time to develop 
alternative energy sources, build the necessary transmission 
facilities, and implement strong conservation programs. We wish 
to emphasize, however, that devoting a portion of the State's 
energy conservation and renewable resource potential to replacing 
Maine Yankee would preclude their use to replace higher cost and 
environmentally damaging alternatives to meet present and future 
demand. 
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Finally, there is no more than a tenuous legal connection 
between the presence of a nuclear power generating plant and the 
placement of a high-level waste repository in Maine, as is now 
being contemplated by the U.S. Department of Energy. An early 
shutdown of Maine Yankee would still leave its existing wastes to 
be disposed of, and have no significant effect on the nation's 
nuclear waste disposal problem. Neither the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982 nor federal regulations would require Maine to be 
removed from consideration if Maine Yankee were closed. The Act 
does require attention in repository siting to the proximity of 
waste sources; but closing a single plant in the Northeast would 
not materially affect this consideration. 
We have not considered the many policy and ethical issues 
that lie outside the scope of your questions. We thank you for 
the opportunity to be of service to you and the people of Maine 
in this complex and important matter. We wish especially to 
express our gratitude to the staff who assembled the information 
and performed the analysis upon which this report is based; they 
and the reports they prepared are listed in Appendix B. These 
materials are available upon request from the Maine State 
Planning Office. 
Most respectfully submitted, 
Public Advocate 
#}, .... ~ Antho-ny Ar strong 
Acting Dir ctor, 
Office of Energy Resourc s 
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A. Legal Process 
A State-mandated, early closing of Maine Yankee would be 
without precedent in United States legal history, so one cannot 
fully anticipate what arguments are likely to be raised, or how 
the courts will respond to them. It is not clear, however, that 
Maine now has available to it any constitutionally supportable 
tools to enforce an involuntary early shutdown of Maine Yankee. 
1. What legal authority does the State of Maine have to shut 
down the Maine Yankee facility? 
Under current federal law, Maine does not possess legal 
authority to close Maine Yankee solely on the basis of health and 
safety considerations. That power is held by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, as stated by the United States Supreme 
Court in the Pacific Gas and Electric case in 1983.1 The Court 
affirmed that under federal law, "the federal government 
maintains complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of 
energy generation." It noted that "a state judgment that nuclear 
power is not safe enough to be further developed would conflict 
directly with the countervailing judgment of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission." It is nearly certain, therefore, that 
1461 US 190; 103 S. Ct 1713 (1983) US Constitution Art. VI, 
Clause 2; see also 42 USC Sec. 2021(k). 
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any State effort to close Maine Yankee for reasons of health, 
safety, or nuclear operations will be found unconstitutional 
under present federal law. 
Inasmuch as the law leaves to the States control over 
strictly economic aspects of nuclear power generation, Maine 
could potentially assert its legal authority to close Maine 
Yankee on the ground that the long run economic costs of 
continuing its operation and disposing of its wastes are 
excessive. Such an economic argument cannot credibly be made on 
the basis of waste disposal costs alone; currently, they are 
one-tenth of a cent, or 4% of the total Maine Yankee power cost 
of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour. If these costs prove to be twice 
present estimates, they would still drive Maine Yankee power 
costs to just 2.6 cents per kwh. 
In contrast, the effects of a nuclear accident on the Maine 
economy could be severe, especially if it resulted in a radi~tion 
release. They include the cost of dismantling a contaminated 
plant; the loss of residential, commercial, industrial and 
agricultural property; health care costs; l~sses in the tourism, 
fishing, agricultural, and other industries important to Maine; 
and disruption of local services. The costs could greatly exceed 
the insurance funds currently available, which are limited to 
$600 million for public liability alone, under the federal 
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Price-Anderson Act. Even for an accident like Three Mile Island 
which resulted in no material release of radiation, repair and 
dismantling costs can be substantial, in the billions of dollars. 
It is conceivable, and argued by some, that the State could 
acquire Maine Yankee through its power to condemn for a public 
use and purchase it against the wishes of its owners. While the 
purchase of Maine Yankee through condemnation cannot be dismissed 
out of hand, it poses serious legal questions. First, the 
constitutional question of public use for the property would be 
raised. If that use related to health and safety concerns, a 
collision with Nuclear Regulatory Commission authority would 
arise. Some other plausible basis, such as the unacceptable 
economic risk mentioned above, would have to be asserted and 
sustained in court. 
Other federal issues of lesser weight might be raised in 
litigation following an early Maine Yankee shutdown. Since it 
would affect Maine Yankee owners and consumers in other States, 
issues of federal control over interstate commerce could arise. 
Specific questions relating to impairment of existing contracts 
between Maine Yankee and its suppliers and customers could be 
raised. Finally, there is a question of how Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission powers over wholesale electric rates would 
affect Maine's ability to close Maine Yankee. 
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There ndw exist seve~al constraints on spent fuel storage 
capacity at Maine Yankee and, therefore, on the prospects for its 
continued operation. In 1982, the Maine Legislature enacted a 
law that prevents on-site storage after 1992 of fuel rods more 
than three years old.2 Some have asserted that this will require 
shutdown of Maine Yankee at that time. On its face, the 1982 law 
does not require closing the plant; rather, it appears only to 
render the owners vulnerable to a court order to remove the older 
rods, which would not necessitate closing the plant. If there is 
no place to which to remove the spent fuel rods, even closing the 
plant cannot result in compliance; but we assume that the owners 
will voluntarily choose not to operate Maine Yankee in violation 
of Maine law. 
Further, a 1984 agreement between Maine Yankee and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prevents Maine Yankee from using 
available technologies to compact its spent fuel, but allows 
further re-racking to increase storage capacity. This will 
result in the on-site spent fuel storage capacity being exhausted 
in the mid 1990's unless the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
license is amended to authorize additional storage. 
2 35 MRSA, Sec. 3366. 
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2. How much, if anything, might it cost the State of Maine to 
compensate the present owners and energy purchasers of Maine 
Yankee in the event of ear}Y shutdown? 
This que~tion may be answered precis~ly only following what 
would certainly be extensive litigation. The likelihood is that 
out-of-state owners would be compensated through some fair market 
valuation of their replacement power costs. In-state owners 
might continue to receive debt service and return-on-equity now 
provided for in customer rates, so no added compensation would be 
due them. 
Maine Yankee's owners may assert that its fair market value 
should be measured by the present value of power cost savings 
attributable to it. For Maine Yankee's out-of-state owners, this 
would amount to between $380 million and $3.4 billion. Clearly, 
the fair market valuation principle and its conversion to dollar 
sums would be vigorously contested in court. 
"Book value" is the method commonly used to evaluate utility 
assets for ratemaking. It would make some sense to use it in 
eminent domain proceedings, as well; but this has not 
historically been done in, for example, town takeovers of private 
water systems. There, compensation commonly exceeds book value. 
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Book value is a measure of the plant's original cost, plus 
additions, less depreciation; it would probably e~tablish the 
lower limit to compensation. The book value of Maine Yankee as 
of March 31, 1986, is $314 million, of which about $100 million 
is fuel; the book value of the plant itself is $212 million. In 
mid-1989, the net electric plant's value will be $185.4 million, 
and the fuel's value will be $57.4 million, for a total of $242.8 
million.3 One-half of this figure, or roughly $120 million, 
would be the low-end of compensation due to out-of-state owners 
from a 1989 shutdown. (See Table 1.) 
Table 1 
MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN 
ESTIMATED COSTS 1989-2008 
(Millions of 1986 $) 
Replacement Power for Maine Customers 
Compensation to Out-of-State Owners 
TOTAL COST 
'Low Case 
$380 
120 
$500 
High Case 
$3,400 
3,400 
$6,800 
In the most unlikely event that the courts were to find the 
closing of Maine Yankee to be within the State's powers of 
condemnation without compensation, no payment to owners would be 
necessary. 
3PUC Staff estimates. 
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Several other financial facts should be recorded here. 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's common equity is $68.8 
million, of which CMP holds 38 percent and other Maine utilities 
hold an additional 12 percent; thus, 50 percent of Maine Yankee 
equity ownership is held by entities outside the State of Maine. 
Other obligations of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company include 
$8.5 million in preferred stock; $75.6 million in mortgage bonds 
secured by the plant itself; and $50 million (plus interest from 
1983) to the federal government for pre-1983 spent fuel disposal 
charges. The Property Tax Division of the State Bureau of 
Taxation values Maine Yankee at $287 million, while the Town of 
Wiscasset values the plant at $380 million. 
3. What will be the likely duration and costs to the State and 
to Maine utilities of litigation surrounding compensation to the 
owner-utilities in the event of early shutdown? 
Considering the unprecedented and highly complex nature of 
such a case, we can venture no prediction of its likely duration 
or cost. Two separate issues would be litigated: whether the 
State has authority to close Maine Yankee; and,if the answer is 
yes, what if any compensation should be awarded? 
If the State asserts the authority to close Maine Yankee, 
the litigation, while substantial, could be handled by the Office 
of the Attorney General without additional staff. If valuation 
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becomes an issue, the litigation will be substantially more 
complex and entail the use of expensive consultants. Proceedings 
in different courts are possible. The many utilities which own 
Maine Yankee, having the burden of proof, would spend much more 
than the State. 
B. Decommissioning Constraints and Costs 
This section addresses technical constraints which would 
affect the timing of a shutdown, and describes our best estimates 
of environmental and economic impacts of plant decommissioning. 
4. and 8. Does the technology exist today for the safe 
decommissioning of a nuclear-powered generating plant? What are 
the costs of decommissioning? 
No reactor of Maine Yankee's size (840 MW) has yet been 
dismantled. As a result, the decommissioning technology has not 
been demonstrated. Several theoretically safe decommissioning 
methods exist; but the absence of an actual demonstration creates 
serious misgivings about not only their safety, but also their 
economic and political acceptability. 
Between 1954 and 1985, 34 reactors of various sizes were 
retired or dismantled, mostly small research and development 
reactors, operated for a few years. Extensive experience is 
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being accumulated on the damaged Three Mile Island 2. Research, 
engineering, and cost studies have been done on reactor 
decommissioning. Planning is underway to dismantle a 72 MW 
commercial reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently working on 
its final decommissioning standards, which will not be available 
until 1987 or 1988. When these are completed, more definitive 
cost estimates and answers to questions of environmental and 
occupational hazards may be available. 
Maine Yankee owners are required to fund its full 
decommissioning costs, estimated at $200 million in 1986 dollars. 
In accordance with a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruling, 
Maine Yankee sets aside $4 million each year in a trust fund for 
this purpose. As of March 31, 1986, the fund contained $12.0 
million; by 1989, it will be roughly $30 million; and by 2008, 
$150 million in 1986 dollars (assuming a 3% real investment 
yield). As decommissioning approaches, any unfunded amount will 
be paid through ratepayer charges. 
Decommissioning costs cannot be avoided by early shutdown. 
If Maine Yankee were shut down early, ratepayers or taxpayers 
would still have to pay $4~6 million per year for future 
decommissioning. 
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5., 6. and 7. What are the public safety and environmental risks 
of the decommissioning process? What level of risk will remain 
thereafter? Where will the contaminated components of the 
decommissioned plant be disposed of? 
We cannot now say precisely how the wastes from either an 
early shutdown or the planned 2008 shutdown would be disposed of, 
where the waste disposal site would be located, or what the full 
costs would be. 
Final dismantling of Maine Yankee will be accompanied by the 
handling of large quantities of radioactive waste, the removal of 
which will involve some level of hazard. Protecting workers and 
finding an acceptable disposal site are two of the most difficult 
decommissioning issues. The spent fuel must be removed before 
decommissioning can take place. Many of the remaining wastes, 
though technically defined as "low-level", are in fact highly 
radioactive. Much of the radioactivity will decay within 30 
years of shutdown, but some will endure much longer. 
Maine Yankee's current plans for shutdown envision permanent 
removal of the spent fuel and other radioactive material from the 
site to a federal repository. There will be no available 
permanent repository for spent fuel before 1998. A shutdown 
before then would entail storage of fuel and low level waste 
on-site for a period of years. 
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There is, at present, no known destination for the 
remaining, low-level decommissioning waste, the volume of which 
will be somewhat greater than that generated during the plant's 
planned operating lifetime. Low-level wastes now go to Barnwell, 
South Carolina, and Hanford, Washington, at a rising annual cost. 
By 1993, federal law requires Maine to have made some permanent 
arrangement for disposal of its own low-level waste. Before 
then, there is no assurance that the low-level wastes generated 
by post-shutdown activities will have a permanent disposal site. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requir~s that a nuclear 
plant site be decontaminated after dismantling, and assumes that 
any radiological hazards which would prevent its use for another 
purpose will be removed. Achieving this depends on the existence 
of waste disposal sites, suitable transportation methods, 
effective decontamination methods, and the skill with which they 
are applied. We think it wise to assume that parts of the site 
are unlikely to be returned to public use for many years. 
C. Public and Economic Costs and Benefits 
This section reviews power supply, energy conservation, and 
replacement power costs and their economic impacts. 
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9., 10., and 11. How much electrical energy and electric 
generation capacity will we need to replace Maine Yankee? What 
are the available options? 
Maine Yankee has an average capacity of 840 megawatts (MWE) 
and produces 4.8 billion kwh each year, of which 2.4 billion is 
the share of Maine utilities. This is 27 percent of the total 
electricity sold by Maine utilities, and 19 percent of all 
electricity consumed in Maine. In addition, Maine utilities own 
small shares of nuclear power plants located outside of Maine, 
and rely on some nuclear power from New Brunswick. (See Chart 
1 • ) 
Chart 1. 
S(){JOCES OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMED IN MAINE - 1984 
"Other industrial" includes electricity generated with 
petroleum, wood waste, and pulp liquor. "Other nuclear" 
includes out-of-state nuclear power. 
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The near-term response to a Maine Yankee shutdown would be 
to import and generate power from the same sources currently used 
when Maine Yankee shuts down for maintenance. These include 
underutilized oil-fired plants in Maine, the least expensive 
available units in the New England Power Pool, or special 
arrangements with New Brunswick. Conditions are especially 
favorable at present because of a Canadian hydropower surplus, 
low oil prices, and idle oil-fired capacity in New England. 
A significant volume of generation capacity could be 
displaced by electric energy conservation. The Maine Office of 
Energy Resources estimates that a concerted conservation program 
could displace the equivalent of a 400 MW power plant, or an 
amount almost equal to Maine's 50% share in Maine Yankee. The 
cost can be as low as 2-3 cents per kilowatt hour in today's 
dollars, which is competitive with Maine Yankee and much lower 
than any new supply option such as biomass, cogeneration, 
Canadian hydropower, in-State hydropower, coal, or oil. 
Conservation measures which the Office of Energy Resources 
has recommended include electric rate design improvements, energy 
building standards, appliance efficiency standards, lighting and 
motor efficiency programs for commercial and industrial 
businesses, and new and stepped-up residential programs. Some of 
these programs are already established; some are in the 
demonstration stage; and others are in various stages of 
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Over 5-10 years, significBnt power replacement could be 
achieved by a combination of alternative sources. These include 
wood and other biomass; waste-to-energy plants; industrial 
cogeneration; and ~ew oil, hydropower, coal, or gas-fired plants. 
Costs per kilowatt hour of all these sources are higher than at 
Maine Yankee; but developing some of them will help solve other 
resource management problems, as well, and will generate jobs and 
revenues within Maine. 
At present, the growth in Canadian domestic electricity 
demand has fallen short of official expectations, creating a 
large Canadian hydropower surplus. Beyond a 10-15 year period, 
this surplus and the world oil market may tighten markedly. 
12. and 13. What further amount of electricity will be needed to 
meet anticipated growth? What will be its cost? What will be 
its public safety risks and environmental costs? 
Assuming demand growth of 2 percent per year to the year 
2008, and allowing for a level of conservation which some find 
optimistic, CMP energy use will rise from 8,700 GWH in 1986 to 
13,767 in 2008, or by almost 60 percent. CMP projects available 
capacity rising from 1,717 MW in 1986 to 2,078 MW in 2008. The 
cost of replacement power is discussed specifically in the 
response to question #14. 
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Meaningful compqrison of the health and environmental 
impacts of the ~lternative energy sources available to Maine is a 
prodigious undert~king. Different national studies have come to 
diff~rent conclusions, and w~ would not feel confident in going 
beyond the following propositions. 
First, however, no discussion of the environmental costs of 
alternative energy sources may proceed without some recognition 
of the grave public safety and environmental hazards qssociated 
with nuclear energy. During routine operation, U.S. nuclear 
reactors release very small amounts of radioactivity which cause 
few 3dverse health effects. The nuclear industry, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and the U.S,. operqting history to date 
off~r strong assurances that the risk of a serious nuclear 
accident at any individual plant is extremely small. Critics of 
the nuclear industry contest these assurances. 
If a catastrophic nuclear accident, however unlikely at a 
giv~n plant, were to occur, it would have enduring impacts on 
public health, safety, the environment, and the economy that defy 
comparison with other energy sources. The nuclear fuel cycle 
includ~s the additional impacts of uranium mining and tailings, 
as well as the ultimate disposal of radioactive wast~s, the 
difficulties of which are now well-known to Maine citizens and 
are discussed in detqil in the r~cent ''State of Maine Comments on 
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U.S. Department of Energy CRP Draft Area Recommendation Report" 
(Governor's Task Force on High-Level Nuclear Waste, April 1986). 
The lowest environmental and health risks among Maine's 
alternative energy sources are those associated with energy 
conservation; but even here, sensible safety and health 
procedures must be followed to avoid problems such as those which 
have occurred with certain types of foam insulation. 
Imports of electricity have few direct environmental or 
health costs to Maine residents since their impacts occur 
elsewhere, except for transmission line construction. 
Over-reliance on imported electricity, however, carries with it 
the possibility of sudden disruption in supply. 
Electricity generated by oil or coal has environmental and 
public safety costs that include oil spills, air pollution, and 
strip mining and mining accidents. There are also the 
world-scale environmental costs of depleting finite reserves and 
modifying the global carbon dioxide cycle, as well as the 
strategic risk of becoming overly-reliant on oil from politically 
unstable regions. 
The use of Maine resources such as hydropower, wood, peat, 
and municipal waste would cause environmental impacts within 
Maine. Woodstoves have caused fatal fires and, in some cases, 
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contribute to local air pollution; waste-burning facilities may 
emit harmful chemicals; hydropower projects affect a river's 
ecosystems and alternative uses; peat mining can lower water 
tables and affect wildlife habitat; and increased harvesting of 
biomass carries with it costs associated with the high rate of 
worker accidents in the industry. Sensible government 
regulation, however, can keep the environmental costs of 
developing these energy resources within limits acceptable to 
most Maine citizens. 
Natural gas is a clean-burning fuel which could be used much 
more widely in Maine in the long run. The construction of a 
pipeline through Maine would be the major environmental impact. 
At current prices, however, major gas expansions are not 
economical. 
14. and 16. How much would electric rates increase from an early 
shutdown? What would be their overall effect on the Maine 
economy? 
Our best estimates of the increased costs to replace Maine 
Yankee power are shown in Table 2. They were developed using 
cost models at the Public Utilities Commission. The ranges 
represent replacement costs under high and low assumptions for 
nuclear operating costs and oil prices. Load growth is 2 percent 
per year in all cases. While a far more complex set of 
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assumptions could be used, we feel that the model captures the 
most important relationships. A much more refined approach would 
not be likely to change the results materially, especially 
considering the wide uncertainties in future oil prices and 
nuclear costs. 
Table 2 
REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR MAINE YANKEE 
(all figures in millions of 1986 dollars) 
Maine Ratepayers 
New England 
Ratepayers 
Undiscounted 
Total 
$380-3,400 
750-6,800 
Annual 
Average 
$20-170 
40-340 
Present Value* 
Discounted 
at 5 percent 
Total 
$190-1,926 
380-3,850 
*Present value represents the 1986 value of the futu~e increase 
in costs occurring annually throughout the 1989-2008 period. 
Power replacement costs for Maine Yankee to be borne by 
Maine people and businesses will be in the range of $380 million 
to $3.4 billion. This excludes the higher costs of doing 
business in Maine that would be passed along to Maine consumers 
in the prices th~y pay. Rate increases to cover replacement 
power costs would vary across the State and be significantly 
higher in Aroostook County, for example, where consumers depend 
more heavily on Maine Yankee power (45 percent) than the State as 
a whole. Table 3 shows the impacts on typical electric rates for 
CMP customers when compensation to out-of-state owners is added 
to power replacement costs. 
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Table 3 
IMPACT OF MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN ON CMP ELECTRIC BILLS* 
(all figures in dollars) 
Present Annual Increase, 1989-2008 
Annual Bill 
Low Case Mid-Range High Case 
Residential customer: 
without electric 
heat or hot water $320 $ 8 $49 $ 90 
without electric 
heat, with electric 
hot water 600 15 91 168 
with both electric 
heat and hot water 1,280 32 196 360 
Small business 20,000 500 2,800 5,600 
Lqrge industry 4,000,000 100,000 690,000 1,280,000 
* Comp2nsation to out-of-state owners is included in these 
estimates. If compensation is funded otherwise, the annual 
incraases are cut approximately in half in the high case, 
and by one-quarter in the low case. 
There are two ways in which compensation to out-of-state 
owners might be funded. Table 3 includes the funding of 
compensation through electric rates. Alternatively, compensation 
(between $120 million and $3.4 billion) would add a major demand 
on the State's General Fund and bonding capacity. 
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We have not fully examined all the economic effects of an 
early shutdown, but would point to several specific, likely 
outcomes. Because of the shutdown itself and business responses 
to higher energy costs, between 1,000 and 1,800 full-time 
equivalent jobs would be lost to Maine people by 1995, based on 
calculations using the State Planning Office's economic model. 
Maine Yankee itself accounts for 640 of these jobs, including 
part-time contractor employment. The range in job losses is far 
narrower than in replacement energy costs, because relatively few 
Maine jobs are highly sensitive to energy costs. The lost jobs 
would be less than 1 percent of the 260,000 full-time, year-round 
jobs now available. The reduction in personal income would be 
between $67 and $93 million per year, or 7 tenths of one percent 
of the State's personal income of $13.4 billion annually. 
Power supply and energy conservation projects developed to 
replace Maine Yankee would probably create far more jobs than 
those lost through a Maine Yankee closing. Studies indicate that 
energy conservation and renewable resource development could 
create as many as four times the number of jobs as nuclear power. 
In 1985, ongoing utility conservation projects creat~d more than 
100 jobs, and energy conservation projects are expected to yield 
far larger numbers of jobs as utility investment in conservation 
is increased. Maine's wood-to-energy industry created more than 
600 jobs in 1985 for construction workers, woodsworkers, and 
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truckers, according to a new study for the New England Governors' 
Conference. Using labor coefficients developed in that study, 
the Office of Energy Resources estimates that more than 2800 
construction jobs and 2400 sustained jobs will be created by the 
wood-energy industry in Maine by 1990. 
The jobs created by energy conservation and renewable 
resource development will come at a high cost to Maine people in 
the event of a Maine Yankee shutdown, however. They will be 
created at a lower cost if these energy sources are used to 
displace new and expensive power plants instead of Maine Yankee. 
Maine Yankee pays State and local taxes of $9.7 million 
annually, mostly in Wisc8sset property taxes. When Maine Yankee 
shuts down, its property taxes will become minimal, causing a 
dramatic increase in local tax rates. Its State tax payments are 
nominal, and could be easily made up otherwise. We have not 
estimated the potential effect on State tax revenues of the job 
and local property tax losses; nor have we estimated any property 
tax gains from replacement sources. 
15. and 17. How would business energy costs and investment 
decisions be affected by the uncertainty over the cost and 
availability of electricity resulting from an early shutdown? 
CMP estimates that a 1989 shutdown would increase its 
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industrial users' power bills between 1989 and 2008 by a total of 
$806 million, in 1986 dollars. We believe this to be a 
reasonable estimate. Because industrial power rates have a high 
fuel co~ponent, the relative effect of an early shutdown on 
industry would be greater than on residential customers. 
To assess the effects of an early shutdown on Maine 
business, it is necessary to distinguish among different kinds of 
businesses. First, are the large, energy intensive users, like 
paper, chemical, and food processing companies. Most have high 
bills for purchased power, since they do not generate all the 
energy they need. Second, is the general range of manufacturing 
and commercial establishments for which electricity costs would 
be a concern, but of secondary importance in location and 
investment decisions. Finally, are the many retail and service 
firms whose electricity costs are small, and whose growth and 
expansion decisions are likely to be unaffected by power costs. 
For heavy electric users, an immediate shift to replacement 
power would be difficult and costly in the short run. CMP 
estimates that its paper industry customers alone, already under 
intense competitive pressure, would pay $5 million in increased 
power rates in the first year of an early shutdown. Long term 
adjustments could mitigate this effect to some extent. 
For the second tier of users, uncertainty in electricity 
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costs would have significant short-term effects only for 
particular firms. An early shutdown would incre8se the 
importance of oil prices to industrial power rates; this would in 
turn increase the volatility of all rates, including those for 
Canadian power imports, whose price is generally tied to oil. 
For the third tier of users, mostly in the retail and 
service sector, we would expect no noticable effect on their 
employment, output, or investment decisions. While they would 
certainly not welcome the rate increase caused by a Maine Yankee 
shutdown, they would not be significantly affected, as most of 
their increased costs would be passed on to consumers. 
Finally, some observers may see an early Maine Yankee 
shutdown as an anti-business statement by the State of Maine. 
Such a perception could affect their current business investment 
choices among competing locations. Over time, Maine's natural 
advantages would re-assert themselves; but a temporary chilling 
effect among such people on Maine's reputation as a place to do 
business may be expected. 
18. How will an early closing of Maine Yankee affect the State's 
long term energy independence and other energy related goals? 
Maine's State Energy Plan declares that "the long-term 
policy of the State of Maine shall be to encourage increased 
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energy conservation, efficiency, and diversification, and the use 
of indigenous and renewable resources, so that the State can be 
more nearly self-sufficient. In the interim, the State should 
encourage the development and use of resources, consistent with 
this goal, which are the least harmful to the environment, which 
stimulate economic development, which promote security of supply, 
and which are available at the lowest possible cost. In 
addition, the State should be prepared to take emergency action 
in case of serious supply deficiencies." 
The Maine Office of Energy Resources has established th~ 
following targets for 1990, to help carry out the State Energy 
Plan: 
1. Increase the efficiency of energy use by 10 percent; 
2. Diversify Maine's energy supplies, and decrease our 
dependence on petroleum to less than 55 percent of 
total State energy consumption (currently 60 percent); 
and 
3. Increase the use of indigenous and renewable resources 
to 35 precent of total State energy consumption 
(currently 25 percent). 
A 1989 Maine Yankee shutdown would compromise some of our 
energy policy goals in the short run, given the lack of time for 
adequate adjustment measures. It would increase our use of 
34 
petroleum products; remove from Maine's energy mix a supply of 
low-cost, in-state generated electricity; increase energy costs 
to consumers and enirgy-intensive businesses; and have at least a 
short-term, adverse affect on economic development in Maine. 
Within a few years, aggressive State government and utility 
company policies, backed by strong public support, could place 
Maine on a sound energy supply path for the future. A concerted 
conservation effort in Maine government, industries, businesses, 
and homes would have a favorable impact on the State's long-term 
energy independence, job creation, and other goals. A major 
initiative could be made to replace Maine Yankee power with 
increased electric generation from indigenous, renewable 
resources, including biomass and hydropower. All this would be 
consistent with State energy policy and goals, since it would 
create jobs and develop secure, in-state, renewable supplies of 
energy. 
The energy from renewable resources would, however, be far 
more expensive than Maine Yankee power, and so would compromise 
Maine's policy goal of supplying energy at the lowest available 
cost. Some conservation programs, while similar in cost to Maine 
Yankee electricity, would be otherwise used to offset the future 
need for new power sources which will be far more expensive than 
Maine Yankee. An early shutdown of Maine Yankee would increase 
energy costs to Maine consumers, who have traditionally paid a 
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higher percentage of their income for energy than residents of 
any other State in the country. 
In addition to increasing energy costs, an early shutdown 
could be a setback to Maine's efforts to increase efficiency of 
electric supply through regional cooperation with the New England 
Power Pool. Other members of the Pool would be adversely 
affected by a unilateral decision by Maine to close the Maine 
Yankee plant. 
19. How would an early shutdown affect the local economy and tax 
revenues in Wiscasset and neighboring communities? 
Maine Yankee is an important part of both the tax and 
economic base of Wiscasset. The plant pays about 95 percent of 
the Town's property taxes; as a result, property values are 
higher than in adjacent towns. Maine Yankee's 290 full-time 
employees account for about one-fourth of the jobs in Wiscasset. 
When one includes contractors, employment at Maine Yankee 
grows to roughly 640 person-years, according to CMP. The annual 
Maine Yankee payroll exceeds $10 million; its purchases of 
contract goods and services constitute an additional $15 million. 
In the event of an early shutdown, most of these jobs, wages, and 
spending flows would be lost to the area economy. Multiplier 
effects would increase the impact somewhat above these numbers, 
36 
and over a one-hour or larger commuting radius·beyond Wiscasset. 
20. If there is to be an early shutdown, what would b~ the least 
disruptive means and schedule to do so, from an economic point of 
view? 
There is no time before 2008 when a Maine Yankee shut-down 
can be scheduled without net economic cost to Maine people. 
Easing the impact of an earlier shutdown of Maine Yankee would 
necessarily entail a careful, orderly planning process, involving 
fair compensation of the plant's owners and creditors. 
With a vigorous effort and under favorable circumstances, 
some major sources of replacement power could be available within 
2-3 years of a shutdown decision. Not until the mid-1990's, 
however, is it reasonable to expect enough of the factors to come -
into play which are critical to an orderly post-Maine Yankee 
energy replacement plan, including: 
purchase or construction of desirable and permanent 
replacement capacity; 
completion of needed transmission lines, facilitating 
power imports; 
an accelerated conservation effort, backed by strong 
public leadership and support; 
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an improved Maine bargaining position as a result of 
not having to make power purchases on a "crash" basis; 
clarification of the disposal options and costs for low 
and high-level nuclear waste; 
better technical and economic knowledge about 
post-shutdown treatment and Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission regulations; and 
time to either consume or sell off commitments for 
nuclear fuel and uranium enrichment services. 
While these developments would ease a transition, Maine would 
simultaneously face increased competition from other States for 
available power and power sources, as surplus capacity 
diminishes. 
21. In light of these considerations, what would be the net 
benefits and costs to Maine citizens of an early Maine Yankee 
shutdown? 
Not all the benefits and costs of an early shutdown are 
reducible to a common measure such as dollars; different 
individuals attach widely varying values to the goal of ending 
the use of nuclear power. 
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Benefits 
An early shutdown would eliminate the risks of a 
catastrophic operating accident at Maine Yankee, the human and 
economic costs of which would be enormous. Low-level waste 
production would cease at Maine Yankee, the State's largest 
generator of this material. However, the wastes resulting from 
decommissioning would remain to be dealt with. Further 
production of spent fuel at Maine Yankee would cease, although 
this will not significantly alter the nuclear waste disposal 
problem for Maine or the nation. 
It has been argued that a Maine Yankee shutdown, or even the 
threat of one, would reduce the likelihood of Maine's selection 
as a high-level nuclear waste repository. The Department of 
Energy's official position is that this will not be the case. 
There is only a tenuous legal connection between the operation of 
Maine Yankee and Maine's continued consideration as a candidate 
for a high-level nuclear waste repository. 
An early shutdown might accelerate the effort to develop 
Maine's renewable energy resources, and prompt greater consumer 
commitment to conservation, largely through higher energy prices. 
Such a commitment is desirable in any case, and could occur 
without an early shutdown. 
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Costs 
In the event of an early shutdown, Maine citizens would face 
costs for replacement power, compensation to owners and 
out-of-state customers, short-term job losses, and the compromise 
of some State energy policy goals. 
Replacement costs for Maine Yankee power would add, on 
average, between 2 and 14 percent to the annual power bill of 
Maine customers, the equivalent of a $20-170 million annual tax 
or rate increase. Together, replacement power plus compensation 
costs will yield likely rate increases to Maine customers of 
between 2.5 and 28 percent. This increase would be most 
burdensome to poor families and businesses already facing harsh 
financial and competitive problems. Some local industries and 
areas would be disproportionately affected because of heavier 
dependence on Maine Yankee power. 
An early shutdown would entail the near-term loss of 1,000 
to 1,800 full time jobs, including those at Maine Yankee itself. 
Uncertainty over power costs could last for several years, 
affecting some business investment decisions. This would likely 
produce an adverse, short-term effect on Maine's economy, which 
would need to be addressed through a vigorous adjustment program 
in those areas hardest hit by the impacts. 
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In the near-term, early shutdown would compromise Maine 
energy policy goals in the areas of in-state generation, foreign 
oil dependence, and overall energy costs. Beyond that time, 
energy conservation, technological changes, and investment in 
alternative energy generation could, with strong public 
leadership and support, place Maine on a sound, long term energy 
supply path, though at higher costs than if Maine Yankee were to 
continue operating. 
Costs That a Shutdown Cannot Avoid 
There are a number of important costs to Maine people that 
cannot be avoided by an early shutdown, and will remain to be 
borne in any case. 
First, the plant will have to be decommissioned at a cost of 
roughly $200 million (in 1986 dollars) at some future time; early 
shutdown does not alter or reduce this cost; ratepayers will 
continue to face costs of $4-6 million per year for this purpose. 
Second, the plant's debt service and preferred stock dividends 
now covered by consumer rates amount to some $7 million per year; 
they will decline over time, but must still be paid through 2008. 
Third, a remaining liability of $$0 million plus interest for 
pre-1983 spent fuel charges is owed by Maine Yankee to the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Finally, the spent fuel rods and any 
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wastes from the shutdown process will have to remain at the Maine 
Yankee site until at least 1993 for low-level wastes, and 1998 
for the spent fuel, due to lack of permanent disposal facilities 
for them. 
22~ What conclusions, if any, may be drawn from the recent 
accident at the Chernobyl reactor in the USSR? 
You have asked that we comment on the recent nuclear 
accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. 
Until much more is known about the causes and consequences 
of the accident, a precise assessment of its relationship to U.S. 
nuclear power plants in general, or to Maine Yankee in 
particular, will not be possible. Among other things, it is not 
yet clear what type of containment the Chernobyl reactor had, or 
whether an accident of this magnitude would have ruptured a 
U.S.-style containment. Nor is it clear that the graphite fire 
(which could not occur in most U.S. reactors) was a cause rather 
than a consequence of the accident itself. 
Under these circumstances, we would not venture with 
confidence beyond the following general observations regarding 
the impact of Chernobyl on the economic and waste considerations 
you have asked us to address. 
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First, the Soviet accident may have some adverse effect on 
the cost of capital to utilities owning nuclear power plants. 
Second, the accident makes very clear the need for much 
higher limits on liability than the current limit of some $600 
million written into the federal Price-Anderson Act. Indeed, a 
system of unlimited liability for total costs, coupled with some 
limit on the annual payment per reactor, may well be a fairer way 
to balance the interests of all parties than is the current 
Price-Anderson framework. The nuclear industry opposes this 
approach, however, as unlimited liability will increase the cost 
of nuclear power at new and existing plants. 
Finally, there is no direct connection between the Soviet 
accident and the nuclear waste problem that initially triggered 
this review. An accident of this magnitude involving underground 
spent fuel does not appear possible. However, it is safe to say 
that any nuclear endeavor requiring popular approval and support 
will now be more difficult to carry out than it would have been 
before Chernobyl. 
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JOSEPH E.'BRENNAN 
GOVERNOR 
STATE OF MAINE 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
AUGUSTA • MAINE 
04383 
Dr. Richard E. Barringer 
Maine State Planning Office 
State House Station 38 
Augusta, Maine 04333 
Dear Dick, 
March 11 , 1 9 8 6 
As you know, the public debate on the Maine Yankee 
atomic power plant has been re-opened by the actions of 
the U.S. Department of Energy and its failed, 
high-level nuclear waste storage policy. Accordingly, 
it is important that this Administration re-evaluate 
the implications for Maine people of an early shutdown 
of Maine Yankee. 
Accordingly, I will be obliged if you, the Public 
Advocate, the Director of the Office of Energy 
Resources, and the Chairman of the Public Utilities 
Commission, in cooperation with the Office of the 
Attorney General, will address the following questions 
and report to me your findings at an early time. If in 
the course of your efforts other questions of direct 
interest arise, I trust that you will respond to them, 
as well. 
In considering these questions, one should bear 
several things in mind. First, Maine Yankee must 
eventually be decommissioned; its current operating 
license from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
expires in the year 2008. Second, before its 
decommissioning, alternate sources of power with 
different costs and their own environmental and health 
effects will need to be developed in Maine, or 
purchased. Third, an early Maine Yankee shutdown would 
involve owners from out-of-state, and would affect 
power supply and costs for out-of-state utilities and 
consumers, as well as for those in Maine. Fourth, 
early shutdown of Maine Yankee will not in itself 
guarantee that Maine will not be the site of a nuclear 
repository, and might result in increased electrical 
costs to Maine people with no additional protection 
from our being the repository State. 
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There are at least three kinds of issues which 
should be addressed regarding a mandated early shutdown 
of Maine Yankee, including legal, technical, and 
economic: 
A. Legal Process 
1. What legal authority does the State of Maine 
have to shut down the Maine Yankee facility? 
2. How much, if anything, might it cost the State 
of Maine to compensate the present owners and 
energy purchasers of Maine Yankee in the event 
of early shutdown? 
3. What will be the likely duration and costs to 
the State and to Maine utilities of litigation 
surrounding compensation to the owner 
utilities, in the event of early shutdown? 
B. Technical Constraints 
4. Does the technology exist today for the safe 
decommissioning of a nuclear-powered generation 
plant? 
5. How and where will the contaminated components 
of the decommissioned plant be disposed of? 
6. What are the public safety and environmental 
risks of the decommissioning process? 
7. What public safety and environmental risks 
remain after decommissioning process? 
8. What are the costs for decommissiong the plant 
and the subsequent security and maintenance of 
the site? 
C. Public and Economic Costs and Benefits 
9. How much electric generation capacity will we 
need to replace Maine Yankee? 
10. How much electrical energy will be needed to 
replace Maine's share of the electricity 
generated by Maine Yankee? 
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11. What are the options for supplying the 
replacement power or reducing the demand 
through conservation, and what are their 
economic costs? 
12. What further amount of electricity will be 
needed to meet anticipated growth in demand, 
regardless of the date of the shutdown of 
Maine Yankee, and what will be its likely cost 
to consumers? 
13. What are the public safety risks and 
environmental costs of alternative energy 
sources? 
14. How much would electric rates increase for 
Maine consumers to replaGe Maine Yankee power 
with alternatively generated electricity? 
15. How would an early shutdown of Maine Yankee 
affect the energy costs of Maine businesses? 
16. What would be the overall effects of more 
expensive replacement power on the Maine 
economy, including State tax revenues? 
17. How would business investment decisions be 
affected by the uncertainty over the cost and 
availability of electricity resulting from 
early shutdown? 
18. How will an early closing of Maine Yankee 
affect the State's long-term energy 
independence and other energy-related goals? 
19. How would an early shutdown affect the local 
economy and tax revenues in Wiscasset and 
neighboring communities? 
20. If there is to be an early shutdown, what 
would be the least disruptive means and 
schedule to do so, from an economic point of 
view? 
21. Finally, give all these factors, what would be 
the net benefits and costs to Maine citizens 
of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee? 
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Again, I thank you and your colleagues for your 
readiness to assume this most important responsibility. 
Sincerely, 
JOSEF ~ BRENNAN Gave~~~ 
JEB:nv 
cc: Peter Bradford, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission 
Paul Fritzsche, Public Advocate 
John Kerry, Director of Energy Resources 
James Tierney, Attorney General 
Senate President Charles Pray 
Speaker John Martin 
Senator John Baldacci 
Representative Harry Vose 
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State Planning Office: Lloyd C. Irland, Harold Payson, and 
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Office of Energy Resources: Steve Buchsbaum, Mark Katz, and 
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Richard Parker, Alfred W. Maxwell III, Joseph Sukaskas, and 
Richard Kania 
Public Advocate: Joel Shifman 
Attorney General: Cabanne H. Howard 
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STAFF PAPERS 
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CHAIRMAN 
Peter A. Bradford 
STATE OF MAINE 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
242 State Street 
State House Station 18 
Augusta, Maine 04333 
(207) 289-3831 
May 21, 1986 
The Honorable Joseph E. Brennan 
Governor 
The State of Maine 
Station No. 1 
Augusta, Maine 04333 
Dear Governor Brennan: 
I have participated in this review in an individual capacity. The 
other PUC commissioners have not been involved. 
COMMISSIONERS 
Cheryl Harrington 
David H. Moskovitz 
Because both I and the PUC may have to review these matters again on a 
different future record, I have not signed the report itself lest that act 
be misunderstood as linplying same prejudice with regard to future PUC 
proceedings. The conclusions reached are generally consistent with ~ 
present views. 
PAB/m 
Enc 1 
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Peter A. Bradford 
Chairman 





